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Public education in Venezuela has deteriorated steadily over the past 25 years. While the 
average educational attainment of the labor force increased from 6.1 years to 8.2 years 
(Ortega and Pritchett, 2006) and the literacy rate for people 15 and older went from 85 
percent to 93 percent between 1981 and 2001 (Ortega and Rodriguez, 2008), the 
government's expenditures on education dropped 36 percent in real terms between 1980 
and 2003 (Ortega, 2005). Average aptitude test scores for high school seniors have dropped 
from 21 to 6 in verbal ability and from 11 to 3 in math reasoning between 1987 and 2003. 
Possibly as a result of the deterioration in the quality of education, and of other changes in 
the labor market, the Mincerian returns to education have dropped from 15 percent in 1975 
to under 10 percent in 2003. 
 
Working amid this disconcerting evidence is Fe y Alegría, a confederation of 
Jesuit schools targeting disadvantaged youth. The program's first primary school was 
established in Catia, a disadvantaged area of Caracas, in a home donated by a local 
bricklayer. Since then, it has expanded to serve 1.2 million students in 15 Latin American 
countries (Gonzalez and Arevalo, 2005). The organization has a number of initiatives, 
including job training, teacher training, adult and radio education, and support for 
microbusinesses, but the bulk of its efforts are spent in primary and secondary education. 
Most observers, from community members to academic researchers, consider Fe y Alegría 
to be quite successful, but no econometrically satisfying program evaluation has been 
undertaken. 
 
Through an econometric estimation of Average Treatment Effect, we compare Fe 
y Alegría graduates to a control group of Venezuelan public school students using the 
results of the Prueba de Aptitud Académica (PAA), a math and verbal test similar to the 
American SAT. Our results show that Fe y Alegría students perform slightly but 
significantly better on both parts of the PAA. The difference between two of our estimators 
suggests a heterogeneous treatment effect, which we then estimate, showing that the 
program is especially beneficial for the disadvantaged portion of the student body. Finally,  
 
we posit that this effect is due to the institution's organizational behavior: Fe y Alegría does 
not spend more money per pupil, but it does have evidently different management and 
cultural characteristics. Specifically, Fe y Alegría's management structure is much more 
decentralized, giving school principals budgetary authority and the ability to hire and fire 
teachers. Partially as a result of this decision making process, the organization has 
succeeded in instilling a “family feeling” in teachers, staff, and students, that we believe 
contributes to the treatment effect. 
 
Because Fe y Alegría is both private and decentralized, this research is related to 
both the literature on decentralization of public services and the literature on school 
privatization. Fe y Alegría represents a scalable alternative to these policy options, as 
evidenced by its rapid expansion within Venezuela and to other countries in the region. As 
we show, Fe y Alegría merits imitation and greater scale. 
 
2. Related Literature 
 
Although we do not focus directly on the issue of decentralization of public services, this 
paper is related to that literature insofar as it touches upon the benefits and pitfalls of 
having decision rights closer to the individual. Galiani, Gertler and Schargrodsky (2005) 
argue that decentralization of public schooling in Argentina in the early 90's helped 
improve the quality of education, as measured by standardized test scores, in well-off 
regions, and had a negative effect in regions that were disadvantaged to begin with. Pães de 
Barros and Mendonça (1998) suggest that neither school financial autonomy nor local 
school boards in Brazil play a significant role in primary school performance, but that the 
principal's appointment power does have a positive and significant effect. Eskeland and 
Filmer (2002) find a positive correlation between performance and the autonomy of 
primary schools in Argentina and King and Ozler (2000) also suggest a positive effect of 
decentralization on parent participation in school decision making in Nicaragua. Aedo 
(1998) presents evidence that Chilean schools that have significant decision rights also 
perform better than centralized schools. More recently, Sawada and Ragatz (2005), di 
Gropello and Marshall (2005) and Parker (2005), as part of a larger investigation on teacher  
 
incentives in Latin America (Vegas, 2005), document educational reforms in El Salvador, 
Honduras and Nicaragua respectively, where either through spontaneous community 
organization or the government's initiative, some autonomy was transferred to local 
schools. The reported results are mixed in part because central authorities still retained 
significant decision rights, although key indicators such as teacher absenteeism and number 
of teacher strikes did seem to improve as a result of the reforms. 
 
Other alternative school systems have been extensively studied. Private versus 
public schooling in general has been one topic of interest both in the US (see for example 
Manski, 1992, Hanushek, 1994, Hoenack, 1994 among others) and in developing countries. 
Private school performance has been compared to that of public schools and has generally 
shown to outperform the public system according to several measures. Cox and Jimenez 
(1990), after controlling for selection issues, show that private schools perform better on 
standardized tests than public schools in Colombia and in Tanzania; Saavedra (1996) 
estimates a differential effect of private versus public schooling on the wages of Peruvian 
workers, and Contreras (2002) estimates a positive effect of the voucher system relative to 
public schools on test scores in Chile. Also related is the more narrow focus on Catholic 
schools, which has mostly been undertaken using data for the US; in particular, Evans and 
Schwab (1995) show that being Catholic per se does not affect educational outcomes, and 
then use Catholicism as an instrument for student participation in Catholic schools. They 
use the binary outcome of high school completion, claiming that it is a much more 
important predictor of future outcomes, and show that Catholic schools outperform public 
schools. 
 
There is a basic agency problem in the provision of public schooling. Principals 
(society and parents) contract implicitly with centralized government administrators to 
provide quality education. The school administrators may have different incentives, and the 
effects of their actions on school quality are difficult to observe. By making the agents 
informationally closer to the parents, decentralization and privatization might help to 
ameliorate the information problem. Empirically, these effects are difficult to tease out 
because both privatization and decentralization are bundles of policies that combine  
 
solutions to some incentive problems but at the same time may cause several others. It is 
not easy to find instances in which policies are undertaken in a way that allows 
identification of the impact of each of its components, i.e. to disentangle the effect of 
increased school principal authority from decreased central curriculum design. The articles 
in Savedoff (1998), although hampered by the natural limitations in the data, provide 
suggestive evidence as to the importance of these agency problems that may be resolved by 
means other than decentralization or privatization. 
 
Despite the high regard for Fe y Alegría and the availability of extensive data, no 
econometric evaluation has been done of the system's effectiveness. Navarro and De La 
Cruz (1998) evaluate test scores and use student-level demographic controls, but their 
analysis is restricted to two Fe y Alegría schools in one Venezuelan state. Our analysis also 
does not provide direct evidence as to the importance of decentralization, but suggests 
based on anecdotal evidence that this factor plays an important role in explaining the 
relative success of the Fe y Alegría system. This paper thus contributes to the discussion on 
decentralization and private schooling as ways of addressing incentive problems that arise 




In Venezuela, every graduating high school student takes the Prueba de Aptitud 
Académica, which is similar in spirit to the North American SAT. Extensive background 
data on each student is also gathered, ranging from the basics of age and gender to the 
profession of the father and what means of transportation the student uses to get to school. 
 
In total, there are 413,607 observations of graduating Venezuelan high school 
students who took the test in 2003. We include only those who are between 14 and 22 years 
old, are not night-school students, and actually graduated that year instead of earlier. We 
then drop the 4,662 students from public schools that are not included in a separate school 
registry that allows us to identify municipalities. Controlling for other observables, this 
group scores 0.15 standard deviations lower on the verbal section and statistically the same  
 
in math, relative to other public school students. Because there is substantial intrastate 
variation at the municipality level, however, we choose to omit these observations in order 
to include municipality dummy variables. Because these 4,662 public school students 
perform poorly relative to other control group students with similar observables, it is likely 
(depending on which municipality the schools are actually in) that their omission biases 
downward the estimated treatment effect of Fe y Alegría, since it raises the average 
performance of the control group. 
 
Our final dataset includes 46,460 public school students and 2,237 Fe y Alegría 
students. Table 1 shows the mean of each variable for the treated and non-treated cohorts. 
Test scores are normalized to mean 0, standard deviation 1. Family income, mother's 
education, house quality, and social class are reported in five classes, with 1 being the 
“highest.” Although we could parameterize these variables, we instead use dummy 
variables for each bucket to retain the maximum flexibility. As we discuss in the results 
section, this non-parametric form is important because test scores will be non-linear --and 
even non-monotonic-- in some of these variables. 
 
Ideally, our program evaluation would compare students who were either 
selected into Fe y Alegría randomly or selected purely on observables to a control group of 
students who applied and were not selected, and there would be zero or random attrition 
through dropouts. Such application records are not available, however, and dropouts during 
primary and secondary school clearly are not random. Our econometric strategy, discussed 
in the following section, depends on the assumption that there is no unobservable factor 
correlated with both graduation from Fe y Alegría and test scores. This is often improbable, 
but we argue that several factors conspire to form a plausible natural experiment. 
 
The key factor behind the natural experiment is that Fe y Alegría schools are 
oversubscribed. Applications to Fe y Alegría at the primary and secondary school levels 
vastly outnumber the available spots: central administrators estimate that admit rates are 
around 35 percent. Each school then admits the poorest children from local neighborhoods 
in a non-standardized process. This process involves an application by the family, a series  
 
of interviews at the school and sometimes house visits by a social worker to more 
accurately determine the socioeconomic status of the family. As a result, conditional on 
having the motivation to apply for Fe y Alegría, which many students do, the selection of 
students into schools is on wealth and geographic location. Our observed variables 
capturing income and house quality proxy very well for the wealth aspect of schools' 
admission decisions. However, if the unobservable characteristics causing a student to 
apply for Fe y Alegría are both not widespread among public school students and positively 
correlated with test scores, our estimated treatment effect will be biased upward. 
 
Ideally, we would also observe the second implicit selection factor in 
admissions, proximity of each student's residence to each school. We argue, however, that 
any differences are orthogonal or weakly correlated with test scores. As part of the 
program's mission to serve underprivileged children in poor neighborhoods, Fe y Alegría 
schools were indeed often placed in the poorest neighborhoods. Over the life of the 
program, however, some of these neighborhoods have changed and experienced relative 
economic growth. In addition, many of the program's schools were once public schools that 
were transferred to Fe y Alegría at the community's request, and it's not obvious whether 
these schools would tend to be in "better" or "worse" neighborhoods. We thus assume that 
the areas near Fe y Alegría schools are econometrically identical to public school districts 
within the same municipality. If this assumption fails and Fe y Alegría districts are actually 
"worse," it will bias our treatment effect downward. 
 
Performing factor analysis on the subset of these variables related to socio-
economic status generates a one-dimensional variable called SES, which we include in 
Table 1. Regressing SES on Fe y Alegría participation and a dummy variable for each 
municipality indicates that Fe y Alegría students are statistically of the same socio-
economic status as the public school students within their municipality, which suggests that 
even though the program intends to target the poorest households, on average, its 
population is not very different from that attending the public school system. On the whole, 
the similarity on observables and the reality of the Venezuelan natural experiment suggest  
 
that it is reasonable to assume that unobservables do not substantially affect both Fe y 
Alegría enrollment and test scores. 
 
4. Econometric Framework 
 
Our fundamental goal will be to calculate the Average Treatment Effect (ATE), typical of 
the program evaluation literature. The ATE measures the difference between the test score 
of each unit in both a treated and untreated state, i.e. how a student would have performed 
in Fe y Alegría vs. how she would have performed in public school: 
 
                  (1) 
 
    Where: 
      = an individual's test score if treated 
     = the individual's score if not treated. 
 
We had initially planned to use program intensity at the municipal level as an instrument 
for participation. This identification is comparable to other program evaluation papers such 
as Duflo's (2001) evaluation of a school construction program or the previous literature on 
Catholic schools. This strategy requires that the placement of schools not be correlated with 
unobservables that affect test scores, which we claim above. Unfortunately, there is not 
enough variation in the instrument to obtain meaningful estimates in the first stage. The 
highest program intensity is under 25 percent, and even limiting the sample to the 31 
municipalities where there is at least one Fe y Alegría high school, the average is under 5 
percent. This makes the estimated ATEs unstable and implausibly high. 
 
As described above, however, this dataset and the natural experiment that created 
the data lend themselves to estimation of the Average Treatment Effect (ATE) through 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and propensity score matching. 
  
 
OLS provides a consistent estimate of the ATE if there is no omitted variables 
bias and the treatment effect is homogeneous. We estimate 
 
            (2) 
 
                Where: 
=The outcome variables, which are the Math and Verbal PAA scores. 
= The treatment dummy, which takes the value of 1 if the student graduated 
from a Fe y Alegría school. 
        = A vector of categorical dummy variables for {Venezuelan, Male, Married, 
Age, Student Works, Father's Profession, Mother's Education, House Quality, Income, 
Number of Siblings, How School Fees Are Paid, Transportation to School, Social Class} 
 
    After  calculating  the  OLS  benchmark,  we use matching estimators to estimate the 
Average Treatment Effect. Our first matching estimator matches treatment and control 
observations based on their propensity score. We estimate the propensity score using a 




where   is the standard normal CDF and   is a vector of parameters. The fitted values 
from this regression are the propensity score, which we denote . The empirical 








Where 1 | 1 = i W Y  is simply the observed test score for a Fe y Alegría student, and 
0 | 0 = i W Y   is the observed test score for a control group student. The matching estimator 
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     In these equations,   is the number of neighbors used for the match; we use   for 
consistency with Abadie, Drukker, Herr, and Imbens (2001).   is the neighborhood around 
treatment (control) group observation i such that there are four observations from the 
control (treatment) group. For our matching estimators, we calculate robust standard errors 
and use the bias-corrected matching estimator à la Abadie, Drukker, Herr, and Imbens 
(2001). Additionally, most applications drop outlying propensity scores, and Crump, Hotz, 
Imbens, and Mitnik (2006) show that the heuristic of using only observations with 
 closely approximates the optimal trimming rule. Although we do drop 
control group observations with propensity scores outside the support of the distribution in 
the treatment group, we do not otherwise censor the distribution because there are a 
substantial number of observations with   in our sample. Chart 1, which shows 
the distribution of propensity scores in our data, illustrates this issue. 
 
As discussed in Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997), our dataset lends itself to 
low bias in propensity score matching for two reasons. First, only a few members of the 
public school control group are not on the support of the distribution of the treatment 
group's observed characteristics. Indeed, as the above factor analysis and descriptive 
statistics show, Fe y Alegría participation appears similar to a natural experiment in that the 
distributions of many of the observed characteristics are similar, although not statistically 
identical. Previous studies using propensity score matching with job training programs 
often struggled with this, specifically that the observed employment rate or wages of the 
treated were lower than any controls in the pre-treatment period. We have eliminated  
 
private school students from consideration here precisely because their distribution of 
observables (and unobservables) is so different in Venezuela. Public school students, 
however, form an excellent control group. 
 
Second, the same questionnaire is administered to both treatment and control, 
and both groups are in a "common economic environment." These issues, of course, relate 
primarily to problems encountered with evaluation of job training programs. All of our data 
come from the same administration of the same test, with the same demographic questions 
asked of each student. Furthermore, unlike the American SAT, all graduating Venezuelan 
high school students take the PAA. Therefore, although the interpretation of the ATE is 
limited to those students who have not dropped out of school beforehand, there is no 
selection bias into the test itself. 
 
Although the Fe y Alegría natural experiment described above forms the basis of 
our assumption of selection on observables, we cannot fully rule out bias due to 
unobservables. However, the Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997) job training data show 
that this bias can actually be less important than lack of overlap and differing economic 
environments, problems from which we do not suffer. 
 
The consistency of the matching estimator requires two assumptions, which together 
are called “strong ignorability of treatment” (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983): conditional 
mean independence and propensity scores strictly between zero and one. 
 
•  Assumption I:                     for  i={0,1} 
•  Assumption II:   
 
Assumption I is the crucial assumption underlying any application of matching 
estimators. In the application to school choice, the concern would be that unobservable 
attributes of the student or her family such as motivation, proactivity, or valuation of 
education would cause the same types of students who select into Fe y Alegría to also do 
better in the counterfactual. If these decisions were made in a statistically random way, or  
 
through an observable nationally-uniform admissions process, this would lend itself to a 
different estimation strategy. As we discussed in the Data section, this is a decentralized 
admission process that in an unobservable way uses primarily observable variables. As a 
result, the conditional mean independence assumption is reasonable, and we can consider 
the propensity score matching results to be unbiased. 
 
Although all graduating students take the test, the ATE is conditional upon students 
actually graduating from high school. Although the support of the observables of Fe y 
Alegría and public school students is effectively the same, there is substantial selection 
through the years of schooling. Specifically, Fe y Alegría as a policy tries to maintain low 
dropout rates, and their average promotion rate is 10 percent higher than that in the public 
sector (González and Arévalo, 2005). Thus it is possible that some students in the treatment 
group have unobservables that would have caused them to drop out of public schools; these 
unobservables would cause the test scores of the treatment group to be lower. This effect 
will bias the ATE downward, but it is difficult to bound the effect in any reasonable way. 
 
In our application to Fe y Alegría, Assumption II requires that we drop observations 
from municipalities or states where there are no Fe y Alegría schools, and thus students 
have effectively zero probability of enrollment in Fe y Alegría. If we believed that there 
were no state- or municipality-level effects on test scores, we would omit the geographical 
area dummies from the probit estimation, and observations in non-program municipalities 
would have a non-zero propensity score. Since there quite plausibly are geographical-level 
fixed effects, however, we must include the geographical area dummies to satisfy 





     Using the above data and econometric technique, we estimate the ATE in test scores of 
being a Fe y Alegría student versus being in the public schools. Before beginning, we re-
emphasize that Fe y Alegría is essentially a technical high school, not a college prep, and  
 
many of its effects on students are of course not measurable in test scores for college 
admission. 
 
     The OLS results, shown in Table II, show that Fe y Alegría students perform 0.05 and 
0.06 standard deviations higher in Verbal Score and Math Score respectively, after 
correcting for observables. Especially interesting in these regressions are the coefficients 
on several of the control variables. As might be expected, younger students tend to do 
better, as do students with fewer siblings. Instead of linear influences, however, the effects 
of family income and house quality seem to be in an inverted-U shape. Wealthier students 
living in “luxurious” houses actually tend to do worse on the exams than poor students. 
This may be because they have secured university admission through other university-
specific tests and thus do not take the PAA seriously. 
 
Propensity score matching gives qualitatively similar results. The probit 
regression used to generate the propensity scores is shown in Table III, confirming 
anecdotal evidence that poorer students tend to be selected into (graduation from) Fe y 
Alegría. Table IV shows the Average Treatment Effect for Verbal Score and Math Score 
are 0.11 and 0.08 standard deviations (although the effect on verbal scores is not 
significant). 
 
Differences between parameter estimates in OLS and matching can be attributed 
to a heterogeneous treatment effect, as discussed in depth in Angrist (1998). Regression 
and matching estimators weight the underlying treatment effects differently: the weights 
applied in matching estimators are proportional to the probability of treatment, whereas the 
weights applied in OLS are proportional to the variance of treatment. The most basic test of 
a heterogeneous effect is to test the joint insignificance of the OLS parameters on the 
interaction between the treatment effect and the observables: 
     
 
      
 
 here is a vector of coefficients on the interaction terms. A χ² test rejects the 
joint insignificance of these coefficients; this is sufficient to explain the statistical 
difference between the matching estimator, which is consistent under our assumptions, and 
the OLS results. 
 
To explore the economic significance of the heterogeneous treatment effect, we 
use the same propensity scores and separately estimate the ATEs for relatively advantaged 
and for relatively disadvantaged students. Table V shows these results for both Math and 
Verbal scores when we break the sample into groups with high (1-3) and low (4, 5) Social 
Class and Mother's Education (4, 5 denotes primary of less; 1-3 denotes at least some high 
school). Relatively disadvantaged children benefit substantially more from participation in 
Fe y Alegría; the treatment effects are statistically different except for the Verbal scores for 
the different Mother's Education groups. 
 
Translating these scores back to the Venezuelan context, the average original 
scores across treatment and control groups were 6.9 on the verbal section and 3.0 in math, 
with standard deviations of 5.6 and 4.5. Thus, the above treatment effects of just under 1/10 
of a standard deviation correspond approximately to a one-half point improvement in the 
raw results of the PAA. 
 
6. Reasons for Fe y Alegría's Improved Performance 
 
We have shown, as cleanly as possible with the existing data, that Fe y Alegría offers better 
education than the public schools, as measured by test scores. We now suggest potential 
reasons for the effect. As González and Arévalo (2005) calculate, Fe y Alegría does not 
spend more money per pupil than public schools. Indeed, teachers do not receive retirement 
benefits and are thus often forced to view work at Fe y Alegría as a “side job.” Thus, 
differences in financial inputs are not the cause of the improved performance of the 
program. Based on our conversations with school officials and researchers, we suggest key 
reasons for the program's success. 
  
 
As a result of its institutional history, Fe y Alegría's structure is different from 
that of the public schools on several dimensions, as discussed in Navarro and De La Cruz 
(1998) and González and Arévalo (2004). From the outset, the public school system was 
not viewed as an effective organizational model, and the initial spirit of volunteerism has 
morphed into a more established structure. Although religiosity was initially important, 
individual schools now vary substantially on that measure, with some schools run by nuns 
and others exhibiting little sign of Catholic influence. The initial growth in the number of 
schools was mainly financed by local community involvement and private donations, a 
process which led to significant autonomy at the school level underneath a national 
umbrella organization led by Father Velaz. This organically-developed structure was 
eventually formally adopted, with the principal and the school council at the center of local 
decision-making and the national leadership dealing with strategic issues such as growth 
plans and fundraising. Three specific organizational and cultural factors factors stand out: 
decentralized decision making, labor flexibility, and the potentially resultant feeling of a 
"family environment." 
 
•  School-Level Autonomy. Although there exists a central authority at the national 
level as in the public system that determines general guidelines and principles for 
the organization as a whole, each Fe y Alegría school retains substantial 
administrative autonomy. Each principal can hire and fire teachers, purchase 
supplies, and sign maintenance contracts, among other things. Each school has the 
autonomy to plan, budget, procure funding for, and execute infrastructure 
investments. Although most fundraising activities for large projects are centrally 
coordinated, the initiative almost always comes from school-level administrators, 
whose ideas tend to be encouraged and well-received by the national 
administration. Furthermore, the schools, through the regional offices, play an 
active role in the national-level budgetary decision making. This contrasts with the 
public school administration, which is much more highly centralized. 
•  Labor Flexibility. Fe y Alegría teachers are not unionized, and their labor 
contracts are much more flexible than those of the public school system. Teachers 
in the public school system are appointed by state-level committees that are often  
 
controlled by politically-motivated labor unions. In Fe y Alegría, they are hired by 
the school principal directly and given a one-year trial period before being offered 
more permanent positions. During this trial period, teachers are not only evaluated 
on formalities such as meeting the school's schedule of activities (e.g. showing up 
on time to class, grading exams and papers in a timely fashion, attending faculty 
meetings, etc.), they are monitored in the classroom every quarter and are coached 
by their more experienced peers. This flexibility relative to the public schools 
likely results in a selection process that produces higher teacher quality. Any 
differences in teacher quality, however, are not the result of higher pay: although 
its wages for teachers and staff are comparable to outside wages, Fe y Alegría does 
not offer a retirement plan. As a result, many Fe y Alegría teachers also work in 
the public schools simply to gain retirement benefits. It seems that Fe y Alegría's 
compensating differentials are principally the improved teacher training and the 
esprit de corps, which we describe below. 
•  "Family Feeling." In visits to two Fe y Alegría schools in Catia and to the central 
administration offices in Caracas, we were struck by what teachers, students and 
administrative personnel termed a "family feeling": a sense of belonging to the 
organization of Fe y Alegría and agreement with the organization's objectives. As 
described above, this feeling reduces input costs by inducing teachers to work or 
volunteer longer hours for lower wages. It also likely increases efficiency of 
school input use, potentially by inducing students to respect school property more 
and pay better attention in class. As suggested by the literature in sociological 
economics such as Akerlof and Kranton (2005), it is possible that Fe y Alegría has 
succeeded in modifying students' utility functions to value education or discipline 
more highly. Even without this sort of "indoctrination effect," Fe y Alegría may 
have simply arrived at a high-performance equilibrium that attracts better teachers 
and induces continual good performance. Our impression is that this "family 
feeling" has been instilled in the organization's culture as a matter of policy and is 






Using a large, rich dataset, we have shown that graduation from Fe y Alegría increases 
scores on the Venezuelan college entrance examination relative to counterfactual 
graduation from public school. The effects are statistically significant for Math scores and 
robust to different estimators and on the order of one-tenth of a standard deviation, which 
represents approximately 16% of the average score in Math and 9% of the average Verbal 
score. These are economically significant effects. We also find that the most disadvantaged 
groups benefit much more from Fe y Alegría than the better off, with estimated effects in 
the order of 1/4 of a standard deviation for the bottom 2 quintiles as opposed to 1/20 of a 
standard deviation for the top three. This suggests that improvements in the quality of 
educational systems, in addition to having important productivity and poverty reduction 
effects, are likely to be equality enhancing, as the educational achievement of the most 
disadvantaged generally depends more on non-familial factors (e.g. quality of schools) than 
that of the less disadvantaged (see Ortega, 2006 for evidence on this for Venezuela). 
 
Because Fe y Alegría schools are oversubscribed and admit students based on 
observable poverty, and also because the dataset is rich and with uniform outcomes, 
matching estimators are plausibly consistent. These results suggest several further lines of 
research and policy recommendations. 
 
To strengthen the evaluation of Fe y Alegría, it would certainly be most 
convincing to randomly select or encourage a cohort to enter the program, creating a true 
field experiment. This would be the most satisfying way to deal with questions regarding 
strong ignorability and the exogeneity of participation in the program. Testing cohorts of 
students in years before graduation would allow the econometrician to better account for 
biased attrition, i.e. dropouts. In addition, a richer set of outcome variables characterizing 
the family and economic lives of Fe y Alegría graduates would likely give a full 
perspective on the effects of the program. This is not, however, the most interesting line of 
future research. If we believe that Fe y Alegría offers a better education, it is important to  
 
know the reasons for that, and also whether the program can be expanded or if its successes 
can be translated to public schools. 
 
If decentralized decision making is indeed a factor in the organization's improved 
performance, it would suggest that the program of decentralization pursued in Venezuelan 
schools in the 1990s should be continued more aggressively. On a more basic level, the fact 
that there is variance in school system quality suggests that policymakers should encourage 
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Chart 1: Distribution of Propensity Scores 
 














Table 1. Variable means for Treated and Non-Treated 
Variable Fe y Alegria Public School
Verbal Score 0.09 0.00
Math Score 0.20 -0.01
Male Dummy 0.47 0.40
Married Dummy 0.00 0.00
Age 16.96 16.73
Student Works 0.03 0.03
Father's Prof: Professor or Exec 0.06 0.07
Father's Prof: Technician 0.09 0.09
Father's Prof: Employee 0.29 0.30
Father's Prof: Skilled Worker 0.37 0.39
Father's Prof: Unskilled Worker 0.17 0.14
Mother's Ed: University 0.08 0.09
Mother's Ed: High School 0.21 0.20
Mother's Ed: Some High School 0.27 0.28
Mother's Ed: Primary 0.39 0.37
Mother's Ed: Illiterate 0.04 0.04
House: Luxurious 0.01 0.01
House: Spacious 0.19 0.20
House: Normal 0.51 0.47
House: Deficient 0.24 0.25
House: Very Deficient 0.03 0.03
Highest Income Bracket 0.01 0.01
2nd-Highest Income Bracket 0.01 0.02
3rd-Highest Income Bracket 0.04 0.05
4th-Highest Income Bracket 0.18 0.19
5th-Highest Income Bracket 0.74 0.70
<3 Siblings 0.29 0.26
3 Siblings 0.24 0.24
4 Siblings 0.19 0.18
5 Siblings 0.12 0.13
6 Siblings 0.15 0.17
Pay: Parents 0.90 0.90
Pay: Family 0.00 0.01
Pay: Scholarship 0.01 0.01
Pay: Education Credit 0.03 0.03
Pay: Student's Work 0.05 0.03
Trans: Own Auto 0.35 0.32
Trans: Parents' Auto 0.24 0.27
Trans: Friends 0.17 0.19
Trans: School Bus 0.10 0.10
Trans: Public Transit 0.10 0.08
Social Class: Highest 0.01 0.01
Social Class: 2nd 0.18 0.17
Social Class: 3rd 0.50 0.51
Social Class: 4th 0.29 0.28
Social Class: Lowest 0.02 0.01
Socio-Economic Status (Calculated) 0.01 0.00  
Source: Authors’ computations using the PEA (Prueba de Aptitud Académica) 2003.  
 
Table 2. OLS Regression Results 
Outcome Variable: Verbal Score Math Score
Explanatory Variables
Fe y Alegria Student 0.05**  (0.03) 0.06**  (0.01)
Venezuelan Citizen -0.26**  (0.01) -0.4**  (0)
Male Dummy 0.09**  (0) 0.17**  (0)
Married Dummy -0.03  (0.77) -0.18**  (0.03)
14 Years Old Dropped Dropped
15 Years Old -0.05  (0.59) -0.11  (0.17)
16 Years Old -0.14  (0.11) -0.21**  (0.01)
17 Years Old -0.3**  (0) -0.34**  (0)
18 Years Old -0.46**  (0) -0.47**  (0)
19 Years Old -0.55**  (0) -0.55**  (0)
20 Years Old -0.62**  (0) -0.62**  (0)
21 Years Old -0.6**  (0) -0.54**  (0)
22 Years Old -0.48**  (0) -0.61**  (0)
Student Works -0.06**  (0.02) -0.03  (0.29)
Father's Prof: Professor or Exec 0.12**  (0) 0.1**  (0.01)
Father's Prof: Technician 0.06  (0.1) 0.03  (0.47)
Father's Prof: Employee 0.07**  (0.04) 0.07**  (0.05)
Father's Prof: Skilled Worker 0.03  (0.38) 0.02  (0.57)
Father's Prof: Unskilled Worker 0.04  (0.29) 0.03  (0.39)
Mother's Ed: University 0.22**  (0) 0.18**  (0)
Mother's Ed: High School 0.16**  (0) 0.13**  (0)
Mother's Ed: Some High School 0.04  (0.34) 0.06  (0.16)
Mother's Ed: Primary 0.04  (0.39) 0.06  (0.16)
Mother's Ed: Illiterate 0.05  (0.3) 0.06  (0.19)
House: Luxurious -0.14**  (0.01) -0.13**  (0.02)
House: Spacious 0.14**  (0) 0.08**  (0.04)
House: Normal 0.22**  (0) 0.1**  (0.01)
House: Deficient 0.12**  (0) 0.05  (0.21)
House: Very Deficient 0.06  (0.19) 0.03  (0.52)
Highest Income Bracket 0.03  (0.57) -0.05  (0.38)
2nd-Highest Income Bracket 0.06  (0.19) -0.08*  (0.08)
3rd-Highest Income Bracket 0.13**  (0) 0.02  (0.61)
4th-Highest Income Bracket 0.21**  (0) 0.08**  (0.01)
5th-Highest Income Bracket 0.19**  (0) 0.06*  (0.08)
<3 Siblings 0.2**  (0) 0.14**  (0)
3 Siblings 0.15**  (0) 0.13**  (0)
4 Siblings 0.09**  (0.04) 0.12**  (0)
5 Siblings 0.09*  (0.06) 0.07*  (0.08)
6 Siblings 0.03  (0.45) 0.05  (0.27)
Pay: Parents 0.03  (0.43) 0.05  (0.2)
Pay: Family -0.13*  (0.07) -0.04  (0.53)
Pay: Scholarship 0.07  (0.26) 0.01  (0.87)
Pay: Education Credit 0.14**  (0.01) 0.11**  (0.02)
Pay: Student's Work 0.16**  (0) 0.15**  (0)
Trans: Own Auto -0.06**  (0.03) 0  (0.89)
Trans: Parents' Auto 0.05**  (0.05) 0.09**  (0)
Trans: Friends 0.03  (0.21) 0.05**  (0.04)
Trans: School Bus 0.04  (0.17) 0.05*  (0.06)
Trans: Public Transit 0.03  (0.31) 0.04  (0.13)
Social Class: Highest -0.07  (0.45) 0.02  (0.79)
Social Class: 2nd -0.32**  (0) -0.15*  (0.06)
Social Class: 3rd -0.43**  (0) -0.24**  (0)
Social Class: 4th -0.46**  (0) -0.25**  (0)
Social Class: Lowest -0.5**  (0) -0.21**  (0.02) 
Source: Authors’ estimations. p-values in parenthesis. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%.  
 
Table 3. Propensity Score Estimation Equation (Probit) 
Coefficient P-Value
Venezuelan Citizen 0.67 0.1
Male Dummy 0.12 0
Married Dummy 0.29 0.12
15 Years Old 0.04 0.87
16 Years Old 0.15 0.55
17 Years Old 0.37 0.14
18 Years Old 0.34 0.17
19 Years Old 0.22 0.38
20 Years Old 0.51 0.05
21 Years Old 0.47 0.11
22 Years Old 0.94 0.01
Student Works -0.25 0
Father's Prof: Professor or Exec 0.04 0.74
Father's Prof: Technician 0.16 0.13
Father's Prof: Employee 0.12 0.23
Father's Prof: Skilled Worker 0.13 0.18
Father's Prof: Unskilled Worker 0.27 0.01
Mother's Ed: University 0.23 0.09
Mother's Ed: High School 0.26 0.05
Mother's Ed: Some High School 0.22 0.09
Mother's Ed: Primary 0.25 0.05
Mother's Ed: Illiterate 0.09 0.52
House: Luxurious -0.24 0.08
House: Spacious -0.21 0.03
House: Normal -0.15 0.11
House: Deficient -0.2 0.04
House: Very Deficient -0.23 0.05
Highest Income Bracket 0.06 0.73
2nd-Highest Income Bracket 0.01 0.93
3rd-Highest Income Bracket 0.07 0.5
4th-Highest Income Bracket 0.18 0.09
5th-Highest Income Bracket 0.28 0.01
<3 Siblings 0.17 0.18
3 Siblings 0.13 0.31
4 Siblings 0.15 0.25
5 Siblings 0.06 0.66
6 Siblings 0.03 0.81
Pay: Parents -0.05 0.65
Pay: Family -0.26 0.2
Pay: Scholarship -0.12 0.49
Pay: Education Credit -0.04 0.73
Pay: Student's Work 0.1 0.41
Trans: Own Auto 0.32 0
Trans: Parents' Auto 0.22 0
Trans: Friends 0.24 0
Trans: School Bus 0.28 0
Trans: Public Transit 0.3 0
Social Class: Highest 0.2 0.47
Social Class: 2nd 0.01 0.97
Social Class: 3rd -0.1 0.69
Social Class: 4th -0.11 0.67
Social Class: Lowest 0.16 0.57  
Source: Authors’ estimations. 
 










Table 5. Heterogeneous Treatment Effect 
   Verbal  Math  Obs 
Class 4, 5  ATE  0.242  0.249  13,768 
  SE  0.101  0.095  
        
Class 1‐3  ATE  0.056  0.079  32,519 
  SE  0.059  0.032  
        
Mother’s Ed 4, 5  ATE  0.071  0.186  19,105 
  SE  0.042  0.049  
        
Mother’s Ed 1‐3  ATE  0.052  0.074  27,182 
  SE  0.062  0.033  
   Source: Authors’ estimations. 
 